The dyarchy of science and religion
At the centre of scientific inquiry lies enshrined the deterministic proclivity of empiricists—that, by understanding the Universe, we no longer remain completely at “its mercy” but, with the knowledge accrued through methodological investigation, become capable to extend our influence to include nature itself—that, through understanding, we may finally assume the seat of the charioteer. It is not so much a fear of any absent measure of control over our own lives so much as it is the want for all that control upon discovering that such is possible; in that regard, would that empiricism be the most accessible medium of inquiry and epistemological pursuit, its ontology then finds purchase in the basis of determinism—social and otherwise.
On the polar-opposite of this weltanschauungen lies the god-believer, whose belief in a supernatural being is a reflection of his or her surrender to the summa of indeterminable entities; the being itself, however, is one of human construction and, thus, the truism of its influence is incalculable. As opposed to the case of the atheist/”moral autodidact”, the case of religion is one of the fear of want of all that control and not its absence: given its foundations in ontological and soteriological bases, religion in its current form and denomination serves to discipline more than explain. However, be that as it may.
Even if not for the sake of this argument, consider: for as long as the positivist argument cannot defy its contradiction by the argument of universal negation, science, too—as a construction of constructivist empiricism—cannot lay claim to assisting with the “process of determination” because it remains just as much a construction as is religion. Does that not mean that they partake in equal measure of the doubts of the thinker who so disputes that one (probably science) is assuredly deterministic while the other is not when it is so clear that the privilege of proving a tautology rests with neither side?